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Abstract 
The purpose of this research was to establish the underlying factors that cause companies ‘to change auditors or 
switch from one auditor to another in Zimbabwe. This was motivated by the need to see if a relationship existed 
between auditor switch and variables such as qualified opinion, non-audit services, audit fees, audit quality, 
change in C.E. O and company size.  The rising concern for auditor switch and the costs both direct and indirect 
attached to this decision and the absence of relevant studies in Zimbabwe motivated this project. Various authors 
were consulted on the problem above and they gave an insight to the problem. This study employed descriptive 
research design as its methodology because this design allows for the establishment of relationships and it is also 
used to obtain information concerning the current status phenomena that describes ‘what exists’ with respect to 
variables or conditions in a situation. The researcher used questionnaires as primary data collection tool and 
several publications to get secondary data. It was observed that audit fees, non-audit services, audit quality, 
change of management and company size among other factors play a role in companies switching from one 
auditor to another. 
Key words: auditor switch, factors causing auditor switch, Zimbabwe. 
 
Introduction 
There are 72 companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The companies cover all the sectors of the 
economy spanning from agro-industrial, banking and financial services, mining, manufacturing, retail, property 
and tourism sectors. Zimbabwe has recently emerged from a decade of economic contraction and world record 
hyper-inflation. The establishment of the Global Political Agreement ushered in a period of stabilization, aided 
by the de-monetarisation of the Zimbabwe Dollar and adoption of a multi-currency system dominated by use of 
the US Dollar. The robust private sector has reacted positively and capacity utilization has grown rapidly 
Background of the Problem: After several accounting scandals during the 1900’s the auditing profession was 
highly criticized for lack of independence and for not being able to provide assurance to the investors and 
creditors (Imhoff, 2003). Due to the auditors’ lack of independence, a debate about mandatory audit firm rotation 
surfaced around the world. Audit firm rotation would lead to greater skepticism and provide a fresh new 
perspective on the companies’ financial statements, (Kwon et al, 2010). It would also reduce the audit firms 
concern of losing clients as a result of disagreements with management. However, the requirement has some 
implications such as increased audit fees and lack of knowledge of the company among new auditors (Imhoff, 
2003). Another concern that has attracted attention among regulators, market participants and academics is the 
rising audit market concentration. Over the last decades, the audit market has become more and more 
concentrated due to mergers between audit firms. In the 1980s and 1990s, the audit firm mergers reduced the 
global Big 8 to Big 5, (Abidin et al, 2010). The demise of Arthur Andersen reduced the audit firms to the Big 
Four (Hamilton et al, 2005). In addition, the regulators also distress that the market concentration would cause 
monopoly power and loss of objectivity and independence since only a few firms would dominate the audit 
market and this trend would limit the companies audit firm choice (Willekens & Achmad, 2003). 
The Zimbabwean audit industry is also dominated by the so said “Big Four” players. There are of course other 
smaller accounting and auditing firms on the market. The country’s financial sector faced crisis in 2003 – 2004. 
According to the Reserve Bank, the key causes of the crisis were liquidity and solvency problems underpinned 
by other factors such as inadequate risk management systems, poor corporate governance, diversion from core 
business to speculative activities, rapid expansion, creative accounting, overstatement of capital, high levels of 
non-performing loans and unsustainable earnings. We have witnessed closure of some of the local financial 
institutions that were listed on Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. 
A number of circumstances might cause a company and its auditor to end their relationship. When a company 
chooses to provide a reason, users of the financial statements should mainly be concerned about the following: 
“internal control weaknesses,” “restatements,” “disagreements on accounting,” “inability to rely on 
management,” “scope limitation,” “unauthorized opinion,” and “illegal acts.” These types of reasons may point 
to deficiencies in a company’s accounting function, and may ultimately affect the reported financial results. 
“Independence impaired” and “cost reductions” reasons could have implications for the quality of the audit both 
before and after the change. 
Reliable financial reports provide required information for managers, investors, creditors and 
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Government. Financial statement users rely on this information only after the external auditor, who is 
independent, confirms the reliability of this information. Firms employ reputable auditors to assure outside 
investors the credibility of financial disclosures and hence mitigate the agency problems (Anderson, Kadous and 
Koonce, 2004). Thus auditors serve a corporate governance role in monitoring a firm's financial reporting 
process (Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003). Independent audit reduces agency costs by verifying the truthfulness 
and completeness of the financial statements, thereby allowing more precise and efficient contracts to be based 
on the financial statements (Cohen, Kbrishnamoorhy and Wright, 2002 
Justification of the research: Mandatory audit firm rotation has been a highly debatable issue worldwide as a 
solution for increased auditor independence. Despite the discussion, not many countries have yet introduced this 
as a legal requirement, and neither has Zimbabwe. Even though there are no legal requirements for companies to 
switch audit firm, several companies voluntarily decide to change audit firm. The purpose of this study was 
therefore to determine the underlying motivations for Zimbabwe limited companies’ to switch audit firm and to 
contribute a further understanding behind the incentives for companies to change audit firm. Unlike prior 
research this study examines the emerging markets (capital and audit) rather than well established ones. The 
rising concern for auditor switch and auditor independence and the absence of relevant studies in Zimbabwe in 
this issue motivated this research. The study was guided by the following objectives: 
• To unearth key determinants to auditor switch in Zimbabwe. 
• To recognize the independence of the auditor in Zimbabwe through the knowledge of the factors that lead to 
change the external auditor.  
• To identify the reasons for the application of international standards of auditing that may affect change in 
the external auditor.  
• To identify the causes for the Office of Audit and that may affect the change of the external auditor. 
 
Theory and Empirical Studies 
Current discussion of audit firm rotation: Corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing 
have raised concerns regarding the role of the auditor. The main criticism has been the lack of audit 
independence, which has resulted in decreased credibility for the financial information, (Chi, 2010; IFAC, 2003). 
The lack of auditor independence has been a worldwide concern and the debate about mandatory audit firm 
rotation has been highly discussed since it is believed to be an intervention for increased confidence for the 
auditor, as well as increasing the audit quality (Arel et al, 2005; Chi, 2010; Kwon et al, 2010).  
The current debate about mandatory audit firm rotation has also been highlighted since regulators and other 
important institutions like IFAC and GAO have argued that long-term relationship between the audit firm and 
their clients may impair auditor independence and consequently, the objectivity in the audit (IFAC, 2003; GAO, 
2004; EU, 2010). In addition, the close relationship between audit firm and client has also raised concerns given 
that it could lead to an eagerness to please the company instead of being the objective the third party (Arel et al, 
2005). Such behavior could result in an acceptance of aggressive accounting and failure in detecting frauds 
(Myers et al, 2003). Henceforth, a regulation for mandatory audit firm rotation could prevent such situations. 
The debate has naturally created proponents and opponents, where the proponents argue that mandatory audit 
firm rotation would increase the auditor’s independence, objectivity and create a fresh new perspective of the 
financial statements. Hence, a higher quality in the financial information would therefore take place. The 
opponents’ argue that it would lead to increased costs for the companies´ and lost knowledge about the business, 
which could result in audit failures and decreased audit quality. (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Myers et al, 
2003; Arel et al, 2005) A further argument for not implementing mandatory audit firm rotation was highlighted 
in prior studies (Johnson et al, 2002; Ghosh & Moon, 2005) where they argue that audit failures are more 
frequent the first year when the auditor is still not familiar with the company.  
Theories on audit switch: Researches in the area of audit switch bring in 4 theories to explain the subject, or 
examine the reasons for auditor changes by companies mainly in the well established markets as well as 
developed countries. These theories include: agency theory; signaling theory, insurance theory and economies of 
scale theory.  
Agency theory: Francis and Wilson (1988) stated that the agency theory is used whenever the reason for auditor 
changes is related to the agency-related incentives for higher quality audit such as diffusion of ownership and 
owner-debt holder conflict. The type and the level of the agency costs (conflicts of interest) in the emerging 
markets may be different than those witnessed in the developed markets. According to Fan and Wong (2005) in 
the emerging markets it is difficult to reduce agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority 
shareholders through conventional internal and external control mechanisms such as board of directors and 
takeovers.  
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According to the agency theory the extent of the information asymmetry between agents and principals in a 
company determine the desired audit quality. As already has been alluded before, it is said that an auditor limits 
the possibilities of agents to hide self-interest behavior that is at the expense of the principal. Research on quality 
of audit services suggests that large, international auditors (in most cases Big Four-firms) provide services of 
higher quality and therefore have a larger mitigating effect on agency-problems, (DeAngelo (1981), Palmrose 
(1986), Davidson and Neu (1993)).  
Agency costs cannot be measured directly. It is generally recognized that agency costs increase with size, 
complexity and diversification of a company because the potential transfer of wealth from the principals to the 
agents relates directly to these variables. The control by the principals over the agents’ actions is inversely 
related to size, complexity and diversification of the firm. In the audit literature, the researcher found three 
specific agency relationships where an auditor can attenuate agency problems: managers as agents of the owners, 
owners as agents of external investors and other employees as agents of managers. These relationships range 
from the manager-owner relationship, the owner-creditor relationship to the employees-owner/manager 
relationship. 
 
 Signaling theory: Beatty (1989) said signaling theory is mainly used to explain the reasons for auditor changes 
before or at the time of initial public offerings (IPO) and the issuing of new stocks. In markets where there is 
asymmetric information on the quality of the goods sold consumers cannot differentiate between those goods. 
The price they are willing to pay is that of a good of average quality in nature. Producers of goods with a poor 
quality are pushed out of the market at this price and disappear. Signaling better quality is one possibility to 
correct for this market failure (Akerlof (1970). 
Signaling theory can also be applied to the choice of external auditors. Asymmetric information between 
corporate insiders and others on future cash flows and agency relationships leads to undervaluation of the 
company, which is most clear in the valuation of shares. This threatens the wealth of the existing shareholders 
when managerial expectations on future cash flows are above average. Therefore insiders have an incentive to 
signal this positive information. The selection of a high quality auditor is a possibility to signal favorable 
expectations, that is, if we assume that high quality auditors only accept clients with favorable expectations. 
Since high quality auditors will lose substantial reputation, capital and wealth if they are involved in litigation, 
these firms are less willing to audit risky clients (Firth and Smith (1995). However, results of empirical  
Research in Canada (Clarkson and Simunic (1994) and New Zealand (Firth and Smith (1995) shows a positive 
relationship between client risk and the size of the auditor, while in the United States of America a negative 
relationship is observed (Clarkson and Simunic (1994), Raghunandan and Rama (1999). The fact that auditors in 
Zimbabwe are rarely involved in litigation makes me suspect that the situation in Zimbabwe is more like that of 
Canada, but research should be done on this matter anywhere. 
 
 Insurance theory: The insurance theory implies that some companies may change their auditors in order to 
share risk (Wallace, 1985) and because they consider auditors as having “deep pockets” ( Kothari et al., 1988; 
Schipper, 1991).  
Users of financial statements may endure losses due to material misstatements. The probability of recovering 
these losses is larger when the company has an auditor and the probability even increases with the size and the 
reputation of the auditor. Large auditors have so called “deep pockets”, that “insure” investors against the 
consequences of incorrect financial statements (Simunic and Stein (1995). 
However, the price of this “insurance” will depend on the reputation of the auditor. High-quality auditors have 
substantial reputation capital and wealth at stake and will avoid auditing risky clients (Firth and Smith (1995). 
Relating the fee to the client risk is one way of deterring clients with too high a risk. This would explain why the 
combination high-risk company - large auditor is sometimes not observed in reality. It is important to notice that 
insurance theory and signaling theory lead to conflicting predictions on how auditor size is related to client risk. 
Following the insurance theory It is expected that companies with unfavorable financial ratios prefer Big N-
auditors to Non Big N-auditors, contrary to the signaling theory. 
 
Economies of scale: Since large audit firms are able to spread the cost of development and support for 
specialized services, it is profitable for these firms to specialize in large and/or listed clients (Eichenseher and 
Danos (1981), Benston (1985), Pong and Whittington (1994)). All studies report positive coefficients for their 
client size variable.  
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The Factors that may Cause Auditor Switches 
Acquisition : Several studies (Bedingfield & Loeb, 1974; Anderson et al, 1993; Woo & Koh, 2001) have 
conducted researches based on acquisition as a reason why companies switch audit firm. In an acquisition both 
the acquired company (subsidiary) and the acquirer (parent company) usually have auditors. Due to high 
negotiation costs and audit fees, only one of them will remain as an auditor for the group. According to 
Anderson et al (1993) the underlying reason for switching audit firm in the acquired company, emanate in (1) 
economies of scale by using the same auditor for the entire group and (2) lack of diversity between the two 
companies. Moreover, other studies (Johnson & Lys, 1990; Anderson et al, 1993; ) mention that the acquired 
subsidiary’s audit firm will be exchanged when the acquired company’s audit firm is larger than the acquired 
subsidiary’s, due to economies of scale. Hence, two auditors´ from different audit firms´ might compromise each 
other, which leads to increased audit costs for the company (Anderson et al, 1993). Furthermore, Anderson et al 
(1993) argue that, in general, the acquirer is larger than the acquired subsidiary’s and therefore it might be more 
cost effective to use the acquirer´s auditor. 
Company size: According to Woo & Koh (2001) an increased company size will enhance the complexity and 
the agency relationship, which makes it more difficult for the owners to monitor the managers, and, debt holders 
to monitor the owners. Since mergers between Big N have increased, the competition have decreased among the 
big audit firms and therefore large companies do not have as many audit firm options as small companies do 
(Bagherpour et al, 2009). Accordingly, they suggest that large companies do not switch audit firms as often as 
smaller companies’, since small companies’ in general do not hire a Big N audit firm.  
Ownership concentration: According to Francis & Wilson (1988), agency costs occur due to diffused 
ownership. Companies with dispersed ownership have more incentives to monitor activities since agency costs 
increases (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A diffused ownership will lead to increased costs and also reduce the 
possibility to affect management since there are many interests to take into consideration (Francis & Wilson, 
1988). Large companies with diffused ownership reduces related agency cost problems by separating internal 
decision management and control since it will diminish the opportunity for agents to expropriate individual 
wealth (Francis & Wilson, 1988). Accordingly, a highly complex control system increases the demand for high 
audit quality in order to control management. Some studies (Francis & Wilson, 1988; Woo & Koh, 2001) have 
found a relationship between diffused ownership and audit firm change, whereas Bagherpour et al (2009) did not 
find a relationship between the two variables. Management ownership: According to Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) there exists  a moral hazard problem between managers and owners since the owner want to increase the 
value of the firm by taking risks, whereas the manager want to reduce risks in order to avoid decreased bonus 
compensation. Accordingly, by increasing the manager’s ownership in the company, the risk taking actions 
could enhance since the manager might benefit from being risk taker due to management ownership (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Francis & Wilson (1988) argue that agency costs could be reduced due to management 
ownership. Accordingly, with increased management ownership, the managers and owners will have similar 
interests and therefore the agency costs will decrease. In absence of management ownership, the managers will 
require high audit quality since they want to increase their credibility towards owners in order to increase their 
compensation (Francis & Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992). Moreover, Francis & Wilson (1988) and Woo & Koh 
(2001) expected a positive relationship between management ownership and audit firm change. Even though 
they did not find a relationship between the variables it is expected that there is a positive relationship between 
management ownership and audit firm change.  Management change: Management change refers to the 
situation where the incumbent management is changed to another management due to bad results (Schwartz & 
Menon, 1985). Schwartz & Menon (1985) argue that failing companies may change management in order to 
rescue future operations. The stewardship theory is based on the perception that managers will choose an auditor 
that will reflect the shareholders expectations. Accordingly, when management has been exchanged, they might 
choose an audit firm that they suppose best reflects the will of the company’s shareholders’. In addition, some of 
these studies (e.g. Beattie & Fearnley, 1995; Beattie & Fearnley, 1998) highlighted management change as one 
of the most important reasons why companies change audit firm. According to Eichenseher & Shields (1983) the 
working relationship between the client and audit firm is important. Hence, lack of working relationship between 
the new management and the company’s audit firm might therefore initiate a change. According to Schwartz & 
Menon (1985) management change will result in new relationships, where the new management has pressure to 
improve the company results. Accordingly, switching audit firm might be one element for such improvement.  
Qualified opinion: In line with the agency theory, shareholders and managers will act in self-interest in order to 
increase wealth. The decision to change audit firm may in some situations be in the best interest of both parties 
since switching audit firm could be an attempt to suppress unfavorable information, (Kluger & Shields, 1991; 
Gómez-Aguilar & Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2003). Companies change audit firm since they want to avoid qualified 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.5, 2014 
 
175 
opinion and the related costs (Chow & Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; Lennox, 2000). Prior studies (Chow & Rice, 
1982; Craswell, 1988; Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001) point out that the manager’s concern about reduced 
compensation is an incentive to avoid qualified opinion. On the other hand, company owner wants to avoid 
losses in stock prices and lending agreements since they want to maximize the company value and therefore, 
they try to avoid qualified opinions.  
Schwartz & Menon (1985) argue that qualified opinions could impair companies’ possibility to loan money from 
e.g. financial institutions. Hence, a possible consequence due to qualified opinions could be increased interest 
rates. Craswell (1988) mention an overall negative price effect for companies due to qualified opinions and 
therefore companies´ will be concerned about receiving an unfavorable audit opinion, given its connection with 
certain costs. Gómez-Aguilar & Ruiz-Barbadillo (2003) argue that some companies´ choose to switch from a 
high-quality auditor to a lower-quality auditor in order to avoid a qualified opinion.  
Audit quality: According to previous researches (Williams, 1988; Beattie & Fearnley, 1995) dissatisfaction with 
delivered audit quality has been a critical factor for companies’ decision to switch audit firm. DeAngelo (1981) 
argues that the auditor must have technical competence and maintain independence in order to deliver high audit 
quality. The signaling theory is in particularly associated with the quality of the financial statements given that 
audit quality is something that could be signaled to outsiders (DeAngelo, 1981). According to Niemi (2004) 
larger audit firms are known to provide more accurate reports and are more informative in signaling financial 
distress. In the wake of the Enron scandal, former Andersen clients that demanded high quality financial 
statements were concerned that the demise of Andersen, and its involvement in Enron would send out negative 
signals to investors. Bewley et al (2008) illustrated that companies who had engaged Andersen, which was one 
of the Big N at the time, had done so in order to signal high quality financial reporting and therefore quickly 
switched audit firm when Andersen’s failure was definite.   
Audit fee: (Bedingfield & Loeb, 1974; Beattie & Fearnley, 1995; Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Woo & Koh, 2001) 
have identified audit fee as the most important reason why companies’ switch audit firm, especially for small 
companies given that audit fees consist of a large part of their total operational income. In contrast to these 
studies, Magri & Baldacchino (2004) demonstrated that audit fees is less important for big companies, and in 
particular for those companies’ who hire a Big N audit firm since other variables like reputation and quality is 
more relevant.  
Non-audit service (NAS): Many audit firms provide additional services, e.g. consulting, as a complement to 
audit service. The provision of non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients has been a longstanding issue. However, 
as the audit market has become more competitive, the audit firms have increasingly used NAS as an additional 
source of revenue. (Deberg et al, 1991).  In addition, NAS is a service that many large companies require as a 
complement to the audit. DeBerg et al (1991) conducted a research on whether a company’s decision to change 
audit firm is dependent on the demand for NAS. Their aim was to examine the development of the auditor-client 
opportunity. However, Deberg et al (1991) could not find any evidence that suggested a relation between audit 
firm switch and NAS. Nevertheless, even though Deberg et al (1991) did not find a positive correlation between 
audit firm change and NAS, it is still our belief that companies may want to switch audit firms due to an 
increased demand for NAS. 
Research method 
Research Design: For the purposes of this study, the descriptive survey design was chosen and this allowed for 
the establishment of relationships. It was also used to obtain information concerning the current status 
phenomena to describe ‘what exists’ with respect to variables or conditions in a situation , Key (1997). It 
provided an accurate portrayal or account of the characteristics for example, behavior, opinions, beliefs, abilities 
and knowledge of a particular individual, situation or a group. 
Target Population: Thus for this study, the target population was 72 companies listed on Zimbabwe Stock.  
Best and Kahn (1993) suggested population as any group of individuals that have one or more characteristics in 
common that are of interest to the researcher. 
Sampling: the sample size for the study was 40 companies. The random sampling technique was used in order to 
acquire an accurate depiction of the general population. The standard sample size according to Law et al is 30% 
of the population which in this case would have resulted to 22 companies, the researcher therefore, moved up 
from 30% sample size to 55% so as to empower the study. Random sampling is a simple sampling technique that 
is less costly in terms of both money and time. This technique is commonly used in field of business and 
management.  
Data Analysis and Discussion 
Response Rate: The response rate was 86% after distributing 40 questionnaires to  companies. The minimum 
standard sample size according to Law et al (2003) is 30% of 72 listed companies which is 21.6 companies. The 
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researcher however, had pushed the number to 40 as a way to empower the study even though a 100% response 
rate was not achieved but still felt above the 30% recommended by Law et al (2003) was still good. It was, 
however not easy to get such a high response rate.  5% of the respondents were Chief Executive Officers 
(C.E.O), 12.5% of the respondents were Executive Directors, 2.5% of the sources of the information were Non-
Executive Directors and finally 80% of the respondents were somehow senior officials of the different 
companies listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange. The researcher would have appreciated C.E.O’s as only 
respondents in the study, but due to their busy schedules, this was not feasible hence, the 5% response rate from 
this group of people. Executive and Non Executive Directors were equally busy and were difficult to get hold of. 
The main source of information was the group identified as other Senior Officials. The researcher assumed that 
this group was equally knowledgeable and valued their contributions.    
 
Work experience:  The study observed that 88%  of the respondents had been employed by their organizations 
for a period more than 5 years. Mosoge (1996) observed that a direct relationship between employees years of 
work experience and quality of service delivery to stakeholders. He stated that the higher the level of experience 
the better the quality of service delivery. These results were evidence of the amount of knowledge the 
respondents were likely to have about their organizations. 
 
The Factors that may Cause Auditor Switches 
According to Anderson et al (1993), changing audit firm is relatively rare and difficult to observe since the 
primary variables could be difficult to detect. Nevertheless the researcher, based on previous researches  by other 
scholars identified some  independent variables which relates to auditor change. The following discussion shall 
be based on the findings in relation to these variables and their relationship to the dependent variable which in 
this case is audit switch. 
Growth of Profitability Ratio: The results follow the overall growth of the economy of Zimbabwe since 2009. 
25% of the companies alluded that their growth rate was very good, 12% of the companies had a good growth of 
profitability ratio, 50% of the companies were satisfied with their growth of profitability ratio and 13% of the 
companies had bad growth of profitability ratio. Generally the companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange are growing as has already been accepted that the economy of Zimbabwe is generally growing. 
Industries are however growing at different rates with mining industry being very attracting. This shows a lot of 
potential in the Zimbabwean economy. The auditing industry has a big market in such an environment. 
 Audit Fee Expense: 62.5% of the respondents regarded audit fee burden as expensive yet 32.5% of the subjects 
could not  regard audit fee as expense as nor cheap. Probably the subjects expressed the audit fee to quality and 
importance of audit, of which it might be difficult to finally regard the audit fee as very expensive. On the other 
hand, audit fees are usually expressed in terms of a percentage of income of the client company. If these fees 
have always been charged this way then again they may neither be cheap nor expensive. The aspect of this study 
seems therefore to confirm that the audit fee could the reason behind auditor switch in Zimbabwe. 
Relationship Rating of Auditor Switch with Audit Fee 
22.5% of the respondents stated that there is a very strong relationship between auditor switch and the audit fee 
and 55% of the respondents said the relationship between auditor switch and audit fee is strong. On the other 
hand 15% respondents accepted the relationship to be of an average nature whilst 7.5% said the relationship is 
weak. This aspect of the research seem to confirm the findings of  Kallunki  et al, ( 2007)  who  identified  audit 
fees  as the most important reason why companies’ switch audit firm,  especially for small companies given that 
audit fees consist of a large part of their  total operational income. 
Competition Against Audit Firms: 75% of the respondents confirmed that the audit market has stiff 
competition, 10 % were not sure while 15% felt that the competition amongst the audit firms was not that 
intensive. A follow up question to this intense completion reveals that this could have been caused by the 
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy during the hyperinflationary environment which resulted in the closure of 
many companies. Auditors have to fight for the remaining companies and in order to get clients some auditors 
ended up offering a lot of non- audit services as a way of retaining and attracting clients. Intense competition on 
the audit market as well as the offering of non-audit services to clients seem to be the reasons for audit switch in 
Zimbabwe since clients will be looking at audit firms offering more non-audit services. 
Audit Firm Size: The results of the study showed that 40% of the companies under investigation engaged large 
audit firms from Big 4, 22.5% engaged large firms from non big 4 whilst 37.5% engaged audit firms of medium 
size. The results also show that the country has an internationally recognized audit industry through the present 
of the big 4 audit firms on the market. The use of medium audit firms by 37.5% of companies that were under 
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investigation  showed that somehow this group of audit firms brings competition to large audit firms and that 
there could be potential of clients switching from large firms to this group of audit firms. 
Relationship Rating of Auditor Switch with Company Size: On making an enquiry on the relationship 
between the two variables auditor switch and company size, the researcher found out that 17.5% of the 
respondents said that there is a very strong relationship, 52.5% said that there is a strong relationship whilst only 
10% were not sure whether the relationship was positive or negative in nature. Only 20% of the respondents 
were said the relationship is negative. This aspect of the study confirms the conclusion made by Williams 
(1990), that company size and audit firm change are depend. 
Audit Tenure: It was observed that 45% of the respondents had been with their current audit firm for a period 
more than 5 years while 30% had been with the current audit firm between 3-5 years wile 25% had been with 
their current audit firm for less than 3 years. A closer analysis revealed that the majority of these auditor 
switches took place during 2008 economic crisis.  Such switches could be linked to any of the variables that have 
been discussed above. 
Auditor Change: It was also observed  12% of the companies under investigation had switched auditors 3 times 
within a 10 year period while 40% of these companies had changed auditors twice within the same period and 
27% had only switched auditors once, yet 21% had never switched auditors within the ten year period.  The 
major reasons cited by the respondents as having motivated audit switch was hyperinflation environment, failure 
by audit firms to detect fraud, offering on non-audit services and change in management of the companies.  
 New Appointments of Chief Executive Officer: The study observed that  20% of the companies had not made 
any new appointments for the post of the chief executive officer within the past 10 years. The assumption here 
could be that these companies are still run by the same person as C.E.O. for all these years. 48% of the 
companies have only made one new appointment of the C.E.O in the past 10 years. Probably, the economic crisis 
and both the political and economic environment that the country was in prior to the formation of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) has contributed much to the new appointments of C.E.O’s as a number of 
skilled personnel left the country for what they thought were green pastures. 32% of the companies had 
maximum frequency of making new appointments of C.E.O within the last 10 years. This group of companies 
had made such appointments 3 times.  
Relationship Rating of Auditor Switch with the Appointment of A New C.E.O: 45% of the respondents felt 
that there is a very strong relationship between auditor switch and the new appointments of C.E.O, 12.5% of the 
respondents said the relationship is strong whilst, 7.5% said the relationship is of an average in nature. On the 
other hand, 15% of the respondents said there is a weak relationship between these two variables and finally only 
20% felt that there is a very negative relationship. Therefore, this study showed that there is a positive 
relationship between the two variables. This finding is a discovery that seem to confirm the statement made by 
Breesch, 2004, that, “management change can affect the company to switch audit firm”. 
Non Audit Services: It was observed that  52% of the  respondents do engage a different audit firm for any other 
services out of audit while 48% of the companies studied would prefer to  negotiate for non-audit services with 
their current auditors. Although it is well understood that the offering of non-audit services by the same auditor 
who is engaged to that particular organization is relatively against auditor independence, this study seems to 
confirm that the offering on non-audit services by the audit firms could be a contributory factor towards auditor 
switch in Zimbabwe. 
Relationship Rating of Auditor Switch with the Provision of Non Audit Services: This study showed that 
there is again at least a strong relationship between auditor switch and the provision of non-audit services.  20% 
of the respondents said that the relationship is very strong, 47% on the other hand said the relationship is simply 
strong whilst 7% rate the relationship as average. Contrary, 23% of the respondents say the relationship is weak 
and finally only 3% felt that the relationship in question is very weak. This aspect of the study does not agree to 
the findings of DeBerg  et al (1991) where they could not find any evidence that suggested a relation between 
audit firm switch and non-audit services. Nevertheless, even though Deberg  et al  (1991) did not find a positive 
correlation between audit firm switch and non-audit services, it is still the researcher’s belief that companies may 
want to switch audit firms due to an increased demand for non-audit services as evidenced by the strong 
relationship between the two variables. Qualified Opinion: All of the companies under study testified that they 
had not received a qualified opinion during the last 10 years. These are public limited companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and I guess these companies work hard to earn an unqualified opinion due to the 
possible harm that may befall on the value of the company’s stock in the event of them receiving a qualified 
opinion. This finding seems to confirm that managers want to avoid losses in stock prices and lending 
agreements since they want to maximize the company value and therefore they try to avoid qualified opinions as 
noted by Archambeault & DeZoort, in 2011. 
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Relationship Rating of Auditor Switch with Qualified Opinion: This study observed that 20% of the  
respondents rate the relationship between auditor switch with qualified opinion as average, 30% of the 
respondents rate the same relationship as very weak and the remaining 60% rate it as being weak. The results 
show that a total of 90% of the respondents agreed that there is a weak relationship between auditor switch and 
qualified opinion. The aspect of the study seems to confirm the findings from Branson & Breesch, (2004) who 
did not find a relationship between qualified opinion and switching audit firm. 
Opinion Shopping: According to the findings from this study, there is no company that accepted that they 
believed in opinion shopping. 88% of the respondents do not purely believe in opinion shopping whilst 12% of 
the respondents are not sure. It is from this 12% percent that the researcher would accept that the element of 
opinion shopping could be real in our company.  Quality Rating of Audit Services: The quality rating of audit 
services in the country from the listed companies point of view ranged from above average to average with each 
having 82.5% and 17.5% respondents respectively. The assumption made for such an outcome by the researcher 
is that, companies are generally comfortable with the audit services they are getting hence, an average rating. In 
addition, these same companies could have been leaving a room for improvements. 
Relationship Rating of Auditor Switch with Quality: The researcher would personally identify audit quality 
as the most important reason that leads to auditor switch. In this study, it was found that the two variables, 
auditor switch and audit quality have a strong relationship as 70% of the respondents felt that the variables are 
strongly related. None of the respondents felt that by any chance these two variables could have a weak 
relationship. The aspect of audit quality in this study seem to confirm the arguments made by  Beattie & 
Fearnley, 1995 that dissatisfaction with delivered audit quality has been  a critical factor for companies decision 
to switch audit firm. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendation 
Conclusions: The study observed that the audit fee being charged in Zimbabwe is expensive and that could be 
the reason behind auditor switch in Zimbabwe. It was also observed that there is intensive competition on the 
Zimbabwe audit market. This intense competition has been as a result of the collapse of the Zimbabwean 
economy during the hyperinflationary environment which resulted in the closure of many companies. Audit 
firms are therefore fighting for the remaining clients and the situation has not improved even after dollarization 
of the economy in 2009. On a positive note it was also observed that the Zimbabwean audit  market though 
dominated by the big four audit firms, it also has small and medium audit firms which thus bring a balance on 
the market. It was also noted that company size and auditor switch are depended. As a company grows there is a 
tendency of wanting a bigger audit firm. 
Despite the Zimbabwean audit firms offering satisfactory services to their clients, it was observed that most 
companies under investigation have not been with one auditor firm for a period exceeding ten years and this 
could be attributed to the challenges that the Zimbabwean economy is going through. Only a few companies 
under investigation have never switched auditors within the past ten years. Further the study observed that the 
appointment of a new board of management to a company is usually associated auditor switch. 
The study observed that most of the audit firms in Zimbabwe are offering non-audit services to clients and this 
could be the reason behind auditor switch in Zimbabwe as companies are increasingly looking at value for 
money. It was observed that there is a strong relationship between auditor switch and the provision of non-audit 
services. None of the companies under investigation had been given a qualified opinion and that management of 
the companies could work flat out to avoid being given a qualified opinion. It was observed that management 
would want to avoid losses on stock prices and lending agreements since they aim to maximize the value of the 
company. It should be pointed out that no relationship was found between auditor switch and qualified opinion. 
Audit service in Zimbabwe was rated to be good and audit quality was identified as a factor that could lead to 
audit switch in Zimbabwe. There is a strong relationship between auditor switch and audit quality. 
Recommendations: Reliable information is the cornerstone of every efficient financial market. The reliability of 
the provided financial information depends mainly on the audit quality, hence, the issue of mandatory rotation 
should be formally accepted as law in Zimbabwe in order to avoid unnecessary auditor switches and also to 
increase auditor independence that will increase audit quality. Public Accountancy and Auditors Board (PAAB) 
should look into mandatory audit rotation since it would lead to greater skepticism and provide a fresh new 
perspective on companies’ financial statements. Long term relationship between the auditor and their clients may 
impair auditor independence and consequently the objectivity of the audit. Its good there is audit switch in 
Zimbabwe but this has been caused by the economic meltdown and if that was not the case companies would not 
have been changing audit firms. Close relationship between audit firm and the client raises concern given that it 
could lead to an eagerness to please the company instead of being the objective of third party. Eventhough the 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.5, 2014 
 
179 
quality of audit service in Zimbabwe was deemed good workshops on quality should continuously be held and 
PAAB should spearhead those workshops and make them mandatory. 
PAAB must look into the audit fees being charged by audit firms in Zimbabwe since it was deemed to be 
expensive. The idea is not to impose fees but to see if things are done above board and if auditing firms are 
following and adhering to auditing standards on auditing fees. 
Though competition is health for quality services, policy makers in Zimbabwe should come up with policies that 
will encourage and attract investment. The intensive competition on the audit market is as a result of the collapse 
of many companies during the world breaking hyperinflationary environment of 2008. The audit market should 
grow so that audit firms are assured of business because as it stand they are forced to compromise and offer a lot 
of non-audit services to be assured of clients. A conducive business environment is not only good for the growth 
of the economy but for the audit market. 
I am of the view that PAAB should limit the amount of non-audit services to be offered by audit firms since this 
compromises auditor independence. A lot of countries in the developed world (e.g. UK and USA) now limit the 
amount of non-audit services to be offered by audit firm as a means to improve auditor independence. 
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